

REMARKS

This is in response to the Office Action dated September 30, 2003. New claim 25 has been added. Thus, claims 1-25 are now pending (claims 14-24 have been withdrawn from consideration).

General Description of Background and Examples of Invention

Certain example embodiments of the instant invention relate to an information source monitor which counts reference information in order to obtain a total number of times a referring URL is used to refer a user to other data file(s). In particular, the source monitor counts the reference information *for each referring URL*.

Conventionally, it is known to count the number of times a user accesses a URL (e.g., see pages 8-13 of the instant specification). Unfortunately, such conventional counting techniques do not take into account the number of times an accessed URL is used to *reference* a user to other data file(s). For example, referring to Fig. 21 of the instant application, assume that the user accesses an HTML page <http://www.news/>, and then moves from this HTML page to a linked page of www.news/1.html; then presses the "back" button to move back to <http://www.news/>; then moves to www.news/2.html; then presses then presses the "back" button again to move back to <http://www.news/>; then moves to www.news/3.html, and so forth until all five links have been accessed via the referring HTML page <http://www.news/>. Unfortunately, even though the HTML page <http://www.news/> was used five different times as a *referrer* to refer the user to other data files, the HTML page <http://www.news/> is counted only once using conventional

techniques (e.g., see pages 10-13 of the instant specification). Thus, important HTML pages that are important *referrers* to a user are not accurately represented using conventional counting techniques (e.g., pg. 13, lines 1-5).

In order to overcome the aforesaid problems, the certain example non-limiting embodiments of the instant invention provide a source monitor 2 which counts the number of times that each HTML page is used as a *referrer* for referring a client computer (or user) to other data file(s). For example, in Fig. 6 of the instant application, step S7 is used to count the number of times that a particular HTML is used as a *referrer* to refer the client computer to other data file(s) (e.g., pg. 32, lines 14-17; and Tables 3 and 4 on pg. 33). Namely, the target to be counted by the counter is the referring URL. Given the scenario outlined above, this would result in a count of five (5) times that the URL page <http://www.news/> was used as a referrer to refer a user/client to the other data files shown in Fig. 21 (see Table 3 on pg. 33) (compared to a count of only one (1) using the conventional technique described above). By counting the reference information for each referring URL, it is possible to recognize referring URLs that are used frequently for reference information; this is useful URL information for the user. This accumulated data may in certain embodiments be sorted according to data type (e.g., pg. 32, lines 18-25; and Tables 3 and 4 on pg. 33).

Claim 1

Claim 1 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. Section 102(e) as being allegedly anticipated by Wilsher (US 6,160,552). This Section 102(e) rejection is respectfully traversed for at least the following reasons.

Claim 1 requires "counting means for counting the reference information to obtain a total number of times references made for each *referring* URL." For example, in Fig. 6 of the instant application, step S7 is used to count the number of times that a particular HTML is used as a *referrer* to refer the client computer to other data file(s) (e.g., pg. 32, lines 14-17; and Tables 3 and 4 on pg. 33). Namely, the target to be counted by the counter is the referring URL.

For example, referring to Fig. 21 of the instant application, assume that the user accesses an HTML page http://www.news/, and then moves from this HTML page to a linked page of www.news/1.html; then presses the "back" button to move back to http://www.news/; then moves to www.news/2.html; then presses then presses the "back" button again to move back to http://www.news/; then moves to www.news/3.html, and so forth until all five links have been accessed via the referring HTML page http://www.news/. Given the scenario outlined above, this would result in a count of five (5) times that the URL page http://www.news/ was used as a *referrer* to refer a user/client to the other data files shown in Fig. 21 (see Table 3 on pg. 33) (compared to a count of only one (1) using the conventional technique described above). By counting the reference information for each referring URL, it is possible to recognize referring URLs

that are used frequently for reference information; this is useful URL information for the user.

Wilsher fails to disclose or suggest the aforesaid quoted and underlined aspect of claim 1. While Wilsher notes various URL addresses for respective information sites often accessed by a user, Wilsher does not disclose or suggest counting the number of times a particular URL page is used as a *referrer* to refer a client to other data file(s)/site(s). Wilshire discloses no technical concepts of counting referring URLs. In other words, Wilsher is similar to the conventional art described above, and is unrelated to the invention of claim 1.

Claims 12-13

Claims 12-13 require counting the reference information to find a total number of times reference was made to each referring URL. Again, the cited art fails to disclose or suggest this aspect of these claims.

Conclusion


For at least the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that all rejections be withdrawn. All claims are in condition for allowance. If any minor matter remains to be resolved, the Examiner is invited to telephone the undersigned with regard to the same.

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Respectfully submitted,

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